Clientelism and Public Safety: the Case of the Municipality of Amozoc, Puebla

Abstract

The objective of this article is to analyze clientelist links in the recruitment of the municipal police between 2014 and 2019in the municipality of Amozoc in the so-called huachicol strip. Clientelism in relation to municipal security forces is a problem both historical and persistent in Mexico, where the recruitment of police personnel often responds to clientelist networks, with the result that the loyalty of police lies with the mayor (presidente municipal) in turn, not as an institutional figure but, rather, as a politician who defines the salaries of the security personnel and their permanence. The methodology applied is mainly theoretical-descriptive and hemerographic, but included ten semi-structured interviews with police officers. The clientelism detected extends to several municipalities along the huachicol strip where police officers indebted to the mayor who recruited them protect criminals engaged in the illegal extraction of gasoline from pipelines. Those who refuse to participate in this business find themselves at the mercy of the criminals (called huachicoleros).