Micro-fundamentos de la corrupción: motivaciones individuales, racionalidad y comportamiento corrupto
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https://doi.org/10.32870/rc.vi3.71Palabras clave:
teoría de la elección racional, prácticas anti-corrupción, economía del comportamiento, psicología políticaResumen
La teoría de la elección racional ha dominado durante mucho tiempo el estudio de la corrupción y el diseño de las políticas y prácticas anticorrupción. A pesar del auge, aceptación y difusión de este enfoque, muchos países, no obstante, no han logrado avances en la reducción del comportamiento corrupto (Heywood 2017; Marquette y Pfeiffer 2015; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2023; Persson, Rothstein y Teorell 2013; Rose-Ackermann y Palifka 2016). Una razón de tal fracaso podría ser que los supuestos de elección racional sobre las motivaciones de los individuos son demasiado simplistas. Una consecuencia que se desprende de tal estado de cosas es que...
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