Independencia y rendición de cuentas en las agencias reguladoras: una aproximación desde los grupos de interés
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.32870/rc.vi4.96Palabras clave:
agencias reguladoras, independencia, rendición de cuentas, grupos de interésResumen
A partir la década de 1990, la mayoría de los gobiernos nacionales han ido incorporando de manera progresiva nuevas políticas regulatorias en diferentes ámbitos económicos y sociales, consagrando así el renovado modelo de “Estado regulador”. Las agencias reguladoras necesitan altos niveles de independencia y diversos mecanismos de rendición de cuentas para separarse de las esferas de los poderes político y privado. Este artículo provee un análisis teórico-conceptual que explica la importancia de la independencia política y la rendición de cuentas ante la sociedad civil y otros actores, como los grupos de interés, en los diversos procesos regulatorios...
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